Describing the Patterns of Nature: Information and the Structure of Physical Theories by Semitecolos, J
Describing the Patterns of Nature
Information and the Structure of Physical Theories
Jason Semitecolos









The patterns encoded in our physical theories are examined in
terms of the amount of information they contain. The predictions
of quantum and classical theory can both be specied as the predic-
tions that contain the least amount of information compatible with
the descriptive framework used. This suggests that the predictions of
these theories is determined by the way we choose to structure our
description.
A model demonstrating this is given. Quantum probabilities and
least action geodesic paths arise naturally in this model as proper-
ties of the task of description. Their appearance in a fundamentally
compatible way suggests an underlying physical conjecture.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the information properties of our descriptions of Nature.
I show how the way we structure a description contributes to the informa-
tion inherent in its predictions. Patterns corresponding to the probabilities
of quantum theory arise from assuming that all of the information in the
predictions is due to the assumed descriptive structure. The geodesic nature
of trajectories also arises in this way.
A discrete model is given that reproduces the quantum probability laws
and least action geodesic trajectories in the one formalism. The model iden-
ties least action dynamics with the dynamics requiring the least information
to describe. Because quantum probabilities appear in a natural way in this
model, it is suggested that it can be used as the basis for a theory of gravity
that intrinsically accounts for quantum phenomena.
Section 2 outlines some philosophical points about theories and descrip-
tions that will help guide the analysis. Section 3 then looks at quantum
theory and classical mechanics in terms of information where we will nd
that in both cases the laws in those theories can be considered to contain the
least information compatible with their descriptive structure. Minimizing the
information can be interpreted as saying that all of the information in the
predictions given by those theories is conferred by the descriptive framework
we use. This is illustrated in the model in section 4 that sets up a patternless
collection of congurations. Quantum patterns and geodesic laws appear as a
result of using a parameter to distinguish between congurations, and asking
what congurations require the least information to describe relative to each
other.
2 About theories and descriptions
The world is full of pattern. From planetary orbits to subatomic phenomena,
we nd pattern and regularity in what we observe. Our physical theories aim
to describe and explain these patterns, and Science has been very successful
in creating descriptions for a wide range of phenomena. However, there
are still serious problems in fundamental physics. Quantum theory does not
have an agreed interpretation, and quantum eects and classical gravitational
eects have not been combined in one clear theoretical description. To move
toward a better understanding of these issues, I would like to suggest that
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we examine the very structure of our descriptive methods.
To begin with, we must be sure to understand the dierence between a
theory and the phenomena it describes. This idea is nicely summed up in
the statement the map is not the territory[1]. As obvious as this appears,
it is amazing how often it is overlooked, especially in studying the founda-
tions of quantum theory. Sometimes the correspondences between theory and
phenomena are drawn with such conviction that they are actually identied
as being the same thing. This can lead us into believing that parts of our
theoretical descriptions are essential parts of Nature when it may not be so.
Opinions dier about what constitutes a theory so I would like to limit
this discussion to the computational parts of a theory. That is, the equations
and formulae we use to compute things, and not the psychological notions
which we use to think about a theory. I am not suggesting that such things
are unimportant, but they will not be the focus here.
It is useful to think of a theory as a black box that computes predictions
1
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We feed into this black box a description of some conguration of the universe
and it computes predictions about what phenomena are compatible with that
information. It is always possible to imagine other black boxes that give the
same predictions but operate internally in very dierent ways. That is, they
have identical input/output behaviour but dierent methods of computing.
Assuming several black boxes provide equally accurate predictions, how can
we choose between them? We usually pick the one that is conceptually
simplest, and this has proved a successful strategy in the past. For example,
Ptolemy's elaborate system of epicycles with the Sun and planets moving
around the Earth was replaced by Copernicus' conceptually simpler system of
circular orbits around the Sun. This was in spite of Ptolemy's system giving
more accurate predictions. There are other reasons to choose one theory
over another, such as aesthetics or how easy it is to work with. However, we
cannot distinguish between two theories with equally accurate predictions by
any physical test.
Viewing the computational part of a theory as a black box makes it easy
to see that the descriptive function of a theory is fully specied by giving its
complete input/output behaviour. These inputs and outputs are expressed
in terms of congurations we can measure in principle. However, internal
workings of the box may be in terms of mathematical structures for which we
1
The word prediction is intended to refer to all of the physical relationships a theory
can compute and not only those concerning the future
3
do not observe a corresponding structure in Nature. For example, quantum
theory operates in a space of complex functions, or complex Hilbert space,
whose existence we can only infer from the theory's predictions. But since we
can specify the theory fully as far as its descriptive capabilities are concerned,
we can specify the patterns of quantum probabilities without Hilbert space.
In the next section we follow this reasoning and look at the information
properties of probability density functions in quantum theory, and the shapes
of paths in classical theory.
3 Guidance from our current theories
3.1 Quantum patterns
To examine the information properties of quantum patterns, we will consider
the probabilities resulting from Schrödinger's equation. The one dimensional
case is sucient for illustrative purposes, but the properties generalise to
higher dimensions.
The Schrödinger equation, together with the Born rule, tells us the proba-
bilities P (x) = |Ψ|2 for measuring some event at a position x. If we are given
the information provided by a potential function, is there anything special
about P (x)?
Assuming we only consider normalised functions, it turns out P (x) is very
special indeed, and contains the least possible information compatible with
a given potential. The exact sense in which this is the case is that P (x)
contains less information than a perturbed version P (x) + η(x).
The argument showing that the P (x) with minimal information content
corresponds with |Ψ|2 will be sketched below with the relvant references. The
important issue is the interpretation of the result as showing that all of the
information `in' P (x) is due to our descriptive structure.
The amount of information required to express a probability density Q(x)








This quantity is also known as the Kullback-Leibler distance and the
negative of the cross entropy. The base of the logarithm denes the units,
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with log2 giving bits.
We can express a perturbed version of P (x) by considering a family of
probability densities parameterised by θ and writing
D(P (x; θ + )‖P (x; θ)) =
∫
x
P (x; θ + ) log
P (x; θ + )
P (x; θ)
dx. (2)
We want to nd the form of P (x) that minimizes this quantity. This can
be done by noting that (2) is related to second order to the Fisher information
I by
D(P (x; θ + )‖P (x; θ)) ≈ 1
2
2I(P (x; θ)) (3)
Where the Fisher information I is given by










Equation (3) is derived by taking the Taylor expansion of (2) about  (see
[2]). This relationship holds under quite general conditions (see [3]).
Minimization of the Fisher information has been used to derive the quan-
tum probabilities given by |Ψ|2 for the time independent and time dependent
Schrödinger equations (see Frieden [4], [5], and Reginatto [6], [7]. A book by
Frieden [8] explores a dierent but related approach).
The important issue is what the minimization of the information content
of P (x) tells us about `where' the information in P (x) comes from. Since we
consider all possible probability densities P (x), and have assumed nothing
more than normalization, the probabilities are a result of the way we choose
to describe the relationships between x coordinates. That is, by using a
parameterised function to reference the x coordinates. The reason this comes
about is given in section 4.
3.2 Path patterns
The least information property of quantum probabilities is reminicence of
least action. A natural question is: Can geodesic paths of classical mechanics
be viewed as least information paths? Naively the answer is yes.
If we consider an arbitrary path through space, we might consider that
the amount of information required to describe it would correspond to its
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length. If the path is a sequence of points in some discrete space then to
describe the path we would need to give all of the points in the path, and
this would correspond to the length of the path. Potentials would correspond
to changing the information contribution of some points relative to others.
This can be viewed as prior information about the points through which the
path could pass.
For the moment this is all we need consider. The model in the next
section shows how shortest paths correspond to least information paths.
4 A model for description
In the quantum case, the minimization of information was understood as
telling us that all of the information in the probabilities was due to the
descriptive structure we used. This will be demonstrated by considering
an abstract space of distinguishable `states' that have no intrinsic relation-
ships between each other. By choosing a descriptive structure to refer to
these states we induce relationships between them in terms of the descriptive
structure.
These `states' are not quantum states, they just refer to things we might
want to distinguish between. We will later see that they can be considered
to correspond to spatial points, but we do not need to assume this and can
study state relationships in the abstract.
We can think of the collection of all of these states as being like a bag of
pebbles where each pebble corresponds to a state but where we don't assume
any relationships between the pebbles. In other words, the pebbles in the
bag are all mixed up. To nd possible relationships between states we need
to be able to refer to them, and so we need to impose a naming system on
them.
To do this we dene a parametric discriminator, D(θ), to be a function
that maps the values of some parameter θ to specic states. This provides a
way of referencing or discriminating between states.
The absence of relationships between states can be modelled by giving
the states random labels that we will refer to as the `raw' labels. Imagine
drawing pebbles randomly from the bag and numbering them with raw labels
1, 2, 3, . . . etc. Replacing the pebbles and mixing them, we can repeat the
procedure and apply θ labels 1, 2, 3, . . . etc. The parametric discriminator
then maps our orderly set of θ labels one to one and onto the raw random
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labels.
Now we ask what the minimum information distance is between two
states. We take specifying a state to mean producing its raw label. If you
are given the label θa for a state then D(θa) points to that state's raw label.
If we want to give the raw label of a second state θb, we can do it in terms
of the rst label θa and the discriminator. i.e.
D(θb) = D(θa + l). (5)
How much additional information did we need to provide to specify D(θb)
given D(θa)? On average we expect to be able to do it with log2(l) + 1 bits.
The extra bit is to specify the sign of l.
If we take the number of states in our state space to be 2n, then the
expected distance between two randomly chosen states is log2(2
n) = n bits.
So we have an interesting situation where a small number of states that
are near each other in terms of their θ value, take fewer than expected bits
to describe relative to each other.
Call the information distance s, i.e.
s = log2(l) + 1 ≈ log2(l). (6)







Interpreting this rate of change as proportional to a momentum p, tells
us that changes in p and l are related by
l p = constant. (8)
We can view this as an exact `uncertainty' relation, giving the informa-
tion change required to describe a state change. This admits a probability
interpretation if we consider the task of selecting a second state at random.
We expect the probability of selecting a second state to be in accord with the
information required to describe that state. So the probability of selecting
a state parameter distance l from the rst state is 2− log2(l) = 1
l
. It is not
essential to interpret (8) in terms of probabilities, as we will see later. For
the moment we will use the probability interpretation as it aligns with the
usual interpretations of quantum theory.
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An exact uncertainty relation is sucient to derive probabilities of the
form given by the Schrödinger equation (and the Born rule), as shown by
Hall and Reginatto [9], [10].
This is done by taking the classical action and adding a quantum term
corresponding to the uncertainty in the momentum given by an exact un-
certainty relation of the form (8). Using the usual methods for minimizing
the action, and interpreting (8) as a probabilistic relation, gives the quantum
probabilities.
Geodesic paths also arise as paths requiring the least information to de-
scribe. Notice that in this model (7) holds for all relative parameter distances
l. As l increases, s and l rapidly become linearly related. So for states
that are large distances away from each other in terms of the parameter
θ, the information distance s becomes proportional to their state distance
l. Thus, for larger distances, least information paths correspond to shortest
paths as suggested in section 3.2.
The same properties are apparent in cases where we use discriminators
with higher dimension. The information properties are not aected since
this is just a dierent way of referencing the congurations, and the crucial
notion of parameter proximity remains the same.
To summarise, of all the types of transitions we could imagine between
states, those requiring the least information to describe relative to our dis-
criminator, are the ones that correspond to quantum and classical laws. This
arises because the information distance between states scales logarithmically
with the `geometric' length corresponding to the discriminator's parameter.
It is interesting to note that the model here is purely relational. The
relationships between states only require that the states are things that we
can distinguish between.
5 Interpretation
The model above produces structures that are formally similar to patterns we
observe in Nature. These patterns appear for almost all choices of discrim-
inator because the overwhelming majority of mappings between raw labels
and a parameter θ are algorithmically random. The patterns can therefore be
considered as a property of parametric discrimination  using a parameter
to distinguish states. Choosing to use a parameter brings with it an implicit
concept of `geometric distance' corresponding to counting the parameter val-
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ues between states.
The quantum and geodesic patterns arise from the logarithmic way that
geometric distance and information distance scale relative to each other. The
physically interesting laws result from expressing least information relation-
ships in terms of the discriminator's parameter.
5.1 Physical correspondences
If we are to consider a model like the one in section 4 to correspond to
our physical observations of Nature, then the parameter values θ correspond
to physical positions. Evolutions appear as transitions between positions
following the `path of least information'.
The success of the model in producing quantum and geodesic rules suggest
that we make the following conjecture about the physical world.
Physical Conjecture: The distinguishable congurations of the
universe have no intrinsic pattern among themselves.
5.2 Probability versus deterministic evolution
We interpreted quantum patterns as being probabilistic, but this need not
be the case. A compatible deterministic interpretation is possible if the evo-
lution is determined not in a probabilistic manner, but by one state making
the transition to the nearest state in terms of information. Since the un-
derlying raw labels are considered to be random, the exact transition would
appear to us as `random'. Overall it would obey the quantum probability
laws because the number of states a physical distance l from a given state
increases exponentially with the information distance s. More bits allow you
to describe exponentially more congurations  twice as many with each
bit.
This raises the question of how to interpret the underlying randomness.
There are broadly three dierent ways to interpret `no intrinsic pattern'.
These can be expressed as propertes of the mapping between our parameter
labels θ and the `raw' labels as given by D(θ).
1. The mapping is stochastically random and corresponds to our psycho-
logical notion of ipping a coin. This concept may not be well dened
mathematically.
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2. The mapping is algorithmicaly random and cannot be specied by any
algorithm shorter than the labelling itself.
3. The mapping corresponds a psuedo-random algorithmic naming sys-
tem.
In the possibly undened situaton 1 we would expect never to be able
to determine an underlying pattern to the labelling by experiment because
none exists.
In situation 2 the pattern of the raw labellings on average cannot be
expressed with less bits than needed to record measurements relating to
those congurations. Consequently no further law will ever be identied.
In situation 3 it may be possible to detect the pattern by experiment,
but the diculty of doing this would depend on the length of the shortest
algorithm that can encode the labelling pattern. This could be considered a
hidden variable.
Because the patterns we observe are due to D(θ) being a mapping that is
at least apparently random, it is dicult to say how much of a relationship
there is between the discriminators used by two dierent describers. We
could not tell if they are similar or share no pattern. There is no reason to
believe that two describers use the same discriminator. The only way we
could make the comparison is if we did nd a pseudorandom relationship
for two observers. If this was the case, we may be able to correlate their
discriminator mappings.
5.3 Time
It is possible to bring time into our `positions only' picture via the Jacobi
action principle. In classical mechanics geodesic paths can be derived by
minimizing the Jacobi action which only refers to spatial coordinates. Time
appears as a parameter that steps along geodesics at a rate proportional to
length. This sits well with the possibility of deterministic evolution where
the evolution at small spatial distances would appear to take place at a
quicker rate than than changes as large spatial distances. If energy changes
correspond to information changes, as we expect from thermodynamics, then
having a generalised time coordinate track the distance along a geodesic
would give us an uncertainty relationship between energy and time, just as
we observe.
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5.4 A holographic principle
Something that looks very much like the holographic principle rst suggested
by t'Hooft [11], appears as a property of the model in section 4.
In our model, if we are given a parametric discriminator of any number of
dimensions, we can fully specify a region of states by giving its boundary. The
boundary, together with the discriminator, allows us to give the raw labels of
all of the interior points. So the information in the region can be considered
to `live' on the boundary. Furthermore, the information required to specify
the boundary is proportional to the number of points on the boundary, which
corresponds to its (hyper-)area.
6 Closing remarks
The model given in section 4 provides a framework for dening the amount
of information required to describe states relative to each other when those
states haver no intrinsic pattern among them. This leads to two main results.
One amounts to a theorem that parametric description confers information
onto the predictions of any theory that uses a parameter to distinguish be-
tween states. The second result is that the physical features of quantum
probabilities and geodesic paths come from assuming that no additional in-
formation exists between the congurations we are describing. This leads to
the natural physical conjecture that the distinguishable congurations of the
universe have no intrinsic pattern among themselves. This can be considered
a postulate for a new theory.
Given that the key ingredients of classical and quantum mechanics appear
naturally, it is compelling to consider using the ideas in this model to formu-
late a theory of gravity. Instead of considering an action corresponding to a
geometric path length, we would use an action corresponding to the informa-
tion required to describe the path. At larger scales geometric distance and
information distance approach a linear relationship, and so gravitational ef-
fects that following from spatial geometry would be very similar to analogous
eects relating to the corresponding `information geometry'. The small scale
relationship between geometric distance and information distance would give
rise to quantum phenomena just as we have described above. It would be
interesting to nd out if any new and testable physical eects are predicted.
If the physical conjecture that distinguishable states of the universe have
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no pattern proves to be accurate, there would be signicant implications
for the way we picture the world. Our experience could be considered a
manifestation of our act of describing. As complex as physical law appears,
perhaps at a basic level there is really nothing to it.
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